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A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs†
By Manolis Galenianos and Alessandro Gavazza*
We estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases 
of crack cocaine. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but 
they determine drugs’ quality (i.e., their purity) only after consum-
ing them. Hence, sellers can rip off first-time buyers or can offer 
 higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again. 
In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated 
model implies that if drugs were legalized, in which case purity 
could be regulated and hence observable, the average purity of drugs 
would increase by approximately 20 percent and the dispersion 
would decrease by approximately 80 percent. Moreover, increasing 
penalties may raise the purity and affordability of the drugs traded 
by increasing sellers’ relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers 
versus first-time buyers. (JEL D12, K42, L15, L65)
How do markets for illicit commodities, such as narcotics, differ from regular 
markets? What would happen to the consumption and prices of narcotics if their 
trade were legalized? How do changes in the intensity of enforcement affect them?
The goal of this paper is to provide quantitative answers of these questions. With 
this goal in mind, we estimate a model that focuses on pervasive moral hazard as 
the distinguishing characteristic of the retail market for illicit drugs—i.e., the “cut-
ting” of drugs.1 We quantify the effects of sellers’ moral hazard on the quality and 
consumption of drugs, providing potential insights into how market outcomes might 
differ under legalization. Our quantitative analyses suggest that the presence of 
moral hazard leads to  counterintuitive implications for policing.
We model a market with unobserved quality, search frictions, and repeated trade. 
Buyers with heterogeneous tastes for drugs search for sellers with heterogeneous 
costs of supplying drugs. Buyers meet new sellers randomly and cannot observe 
drug purity before consuming it—i.e., illicit drugs are experience goods. Following 
1 While some legal markets feature quality uncertainty and sellers’ moral hazard, in Section II we document that 
approximately 15 percent of crack cocaine purchases involve zero purity—i.e., they are complete rip-offs. It is hard 
to find a legal market with comparable levels of outright fraud. Moreover, the cutting of drugs happens mainly at the 
retail level since wholesale operations (i.e., transportation) are more efficient if drugs are pure. 
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the key insight of Galenianos, Pacula, and Persico (2012), quality is  noncontractible, 
which creates a moral hazard problem; this is the key way in which the model cap-
tures an illegal market in which there are no institutions to enforce quality stan-
dards.2 When a buyer meets a seller who offers a sufficiently high level of quality, he 
forms a  long-term relationship with this seller. The  buyer-seller relationship persists 
until either the buyer meets a new seller who offers  higher-quality drugs or an exog-
enous shock (e.g., policing) severs it.
Buyers’ inability to ascertain drug quality creates a  trade-off for sellers. On the 
one hand, moral hazard: sellers can offer  low-quality drugs, thereby maximizing 
instantaneous profits. On the other hand,  long-term relationships: sellers can offer 
 high-quality drugs that induce buyers to purchase from them again, thereby increas-
ing their customer base. Hence,  long-term relationships are the principal counter-
weight to the moral hazard problem inherent in illegal markets. In equilibrium, a 
distribution of quality levels persists:  high-cost sellers rip their ( first-time) buyers 
off by offering  zero-purity drugs, whereas  low-cost sellers offer  high-quality drugs 
to attract  long-term customers.
We estimate the model combining two distinct datasets that provide key pieces of 
information on the crack cocaine market in the United States: (i) the distribution of 
drug qualities offered in the market; (ii) the proportion of buyers who purchase from 
their regular sellers; and (iii) buyers’ frequency of drug purchases, including the dif-
ference in purchase frequency between those who buy from regular sellers and those 
who buy from new sellers. The model fits the data well, and the estimation reveals 
that the key elements of our model play an important role in the crack cocaine 
market. Specifically, search frictions are  nontrivial: a buyer meets a new seller, on 
average, approximately every 24 days. Relationships between buyers and sellers are 
quite  short lived: they exogenously end, on average, every 41 days. Nonetheless, 
regular buyers are valuable to sellers, as they consume very frequently—on average, 
approximately 19 times per month—confirming that frequent users account for the 
vast majority of crack cocaine purchases (Kilmer et al. 2014). Overall, search and 
information frictions imply a large dispersion of drug qualities. Finally, the esti-
mates imply that sellers’ profits are extremely skewed, with very few ( low-cost) 
sellers reaping substantial profits and most sellers earning less than the minimum 
wage, consistent with the descriptive evidence reported by Reuter et al. (1990) and 
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000).
We use our parameter estimates to perform two counterfactual analyses. First, 
we quantify the importance of imperfect observability of drug quality and moral 
hazard for market outcomes. We modify our baseline model by assuming that buy-
ers observe drug quality before making a purchase, thereby eliminating moral haz-
ard. In the equilibrium of this counterfactual market,  zero-purity drugs disappear, 
but quality dispersion persists due to search frictions. Quantitatively,  price-adjusted 
average quality increases by 20 percent. Interestingly, the standard deviation of 
purity decreases by approximately 80 percent relative to the baseline case, implying 
2 We study the market given that trade is illegal, abstracting from why it is illegal, which may be because of 
paternalism or because of externalities that market participants impose on nonmarket participants (for an analysis of 
some of the externalities due to crack cocaine, see Fryer et al. 2013). Hence, we do not perform a welfare analysis in 
the counterfactuals of Section IVD since, for example, externalities could be of first-order importance in aggregate 
welfare. Of course, some of these externalities arise exactly because trade is illegal. 
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that imperfect observability, rather than search frictions, is the main cause of the dis-
persion of quality.3 Overall, these large changes in the distribution of purity trigger 
smaller increases in the number of buyers (of 7 percent) and in the individual con-
sumption of crack cocaine (of 4 percent). Since we posit that pervasive imperfect 
observability and moral hazard are defining characteristics of illegal markets, this 
counterfactual could provide some insights into how outcomes would differ if drugs 
markets were legal. Of course, legalization would affect many other features of the 
market, but our analysis points out that quality uncertainty will decrease and the 
average quality of drugs will increase if buyers gain better information.
Our second counterfactual studies how penalties on buyers and sellers affect 
market outcomes. The motivation is that in the past 30 years the United States has 
markedly increased the enforcement and severity of its drug laws—the  so-called 
“war on drugs”—which has resulted in the tripling of arrests for  drug-related offens-
es.4 Interestingly, during the same period, drugs have become dramatically cheaper 
and purer. In our model, lower enforcement may lead to lower drug quality and 
higher quality uncertainty. This counterintuitive result is mainly the outcome of the 
interaction between moral hazard and  long-term relationships. Lower enforcement 
on sellers increases their number. Hence, the rate at which buyers meet with new 
sellers increases, and the expected duration of  buyer-seller relationships declines. 
Therefore, the profitability of establishing  long-term relationships falls relative to 
that of cheating, which leads to more cheating and lower average quality. In addi-
tion, the  newly entered sellers have higher costs and, thus, are more likely to rip off 
their customers.
Quantitatively, we find that a  15 percent decrease in sellers’ penalties leads to 
a  13 percent decrease in average quality and a  20 percent increase in the standard 
deviation of quality (and similar results obtain when we reduce buyers’ penalties). 
Hence, our analysis suggests that increasing penalties may have contributed to the 
observed increased purity and affordability of retail drugs in the United States. Of 
course, the market for drugs has changed in many ways over time (among others, 
through economies of scale in the transportation of drugs to the United States); 
nonetheless, we find it interesting that our model is consistent with these observed 
trends.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I reviews the literature. Section II intro-
duces the data. Section III presents the theoretical model. Section IV presents our 
quantitative analysis: we estimate the model, illustrate its main implications, and 
perform counterfactual analyses. Section V concludes. Appendices A and B col-
lect all proofs and report the derivation of the density of buyers’ preferences in the 
ADAM dataset, respectively. Online Appendices C and D further present the details 
of the solution of the model with observable quality and report on additional coun-
terfactual analyses, respectively.
3 A reduction in quality dispersion may bring health benefits: Caulkins (2007) argues that greater variability 
in purity predicts overdoses, because users inadvertently consume more pure drug than they intend to when they 
purchase drugs that are more pure than is typical. 
4 At the same time, the number of arrests for non-drug-related offenses has barely changed (Kuziemko and 
Levitt 2004). 
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I. Related Literature
The paper contributes to several strands of the empirical literature. The first, 
which is vast and mainly descriptive, is the literature on illegal markets. Most empir-
ical analyses of illegal markets rely on the traditional economic assumptions of per-
fect information and/or a centralized market, following the influential theoretical 
analysis of Becker, Murphy, and Grossman (2006). This framework, however, can-
not explain the extensive amount of cheating that we observe in the data because 
it abstracts from two defining features of illicit markets on which our quantitative 
analysis focuses: moral hazard and search frictions. Hence, it may not be well suited 
to understanding the implications of different policies, such as penalties on buyers 
and sellers. In this strand of the literature, the closest papers include Reuter and 
Caulkins (2004), which discusses information issues in drug markets; Jacobi and 
Sovinsky (2016), which studies buyers’ limited information about drug accessibil-
ity; and Adda, McConnell, and Rasul (2014), which analyzes the effects of depe-
nalization on the cannabis market (but does not consider the role of information 
frictions). We build on Galenianos, Pacula, and Persico (2012), but we differ in two 
ways: our primary contribution is empirical, and we include some novel features in 
our model (recounted in Section III). In turn, our framework delivers a closer con-
nection with the data and allows us to perform  out-of-sample analyses.
Our second contribution is to the literature that studies firms’ quality decisions 
when quality is not observable (or not contractible). To our knowledge, papers in 
this strand of the literature examine markets for legal goods. Many empirical contri-
butions have analyzed the role of quality certification and consumers’ and suppliers’ 
responses to it: for a thorough survey, see Dranove and Jin (2010). Empirical analy-
ses of moral hazard have focused mainly on the behavior of intermediaries: see, for 
example, Iizuka (2012) for the case of physicians and prescription drugs. Our paper 
examines the importance of moral hazard in the context of an illegal market, where 
search and matching frictions are pervasive, and innovates on previous descriptive 
empirical work by estimating a dynamic equilibrium model that allows the quantifi-
cation of these effects on market outcomes.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature on the structural estimation of 
search models. Almost all empirical applications to product markets use static mod-
els: recent contributions include Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004); Hong and Shum 
(2006); Wildenbeest (2011); and Allen, Clark, and Houde (2014). Notable excep-
tions are Cebul et al. (2011), which uses a dynamic search model to understand the 
role of buyers’ turnover in health insurance pricing, and Gavazza (2016), which 
estimates a dynamic model of a decentralized asset market to study the effects of 
intermediaries on asset allocations and asset prices. Instead, we build a dynamic 
model that highlights the role of  long-term  buyer-seller relationships.5 Most applica-
tions of dynamic search models focus on labor markets; Eckstein and Van den Berg 
(2007) provide an insightful survey of this literature and, within the  labor-market 
context, Bontemps. Robin, and Van den Berg (1999) is the closest empirical paper. 
5 Hence, the paper also touches upon some of the issues that the literature on customer markets highlights. Most 
empirical investigations focus on markets for services, whereas we focus on a product market. See, for example, 
Boot (2000) for a survey of the literature on relationship banking. 
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We  innovate on all previous empirical contributions by quantifying the effects of an 
additional friction—i.e., the imperfect observability of product quality at the time 
of the transaction—and its implications for how penalties affect market outcomes.
II. Data
The available data dictate some of the modeling choices of this paper. For this 
reason, we describe the data before presenting the model. This description also intro-
duces some of the identification issues that we discuss in more detail in Section IVB.
A. Data Sources
We combine two main datasets. The first is an extensive database on drug pur-
chases; the second is a survey that collects information about drug use among arrest-
ees. We now describe these datasets in more detail.
The System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE).—STRIDE 
(United States Drug Enforcement Administration 2013) is a database of drug 
exhibits sent to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) laboratories for analysis. 
Exhibits in the database are recorded by the DEA, other federal agencies, and local 
law enforcement agencies. The data contain records of acquisitions of illegal drugs 
by undercover agents and DEA informants. Economic analyses of markets for ille-
gal drugs have widely used STRIDE, although it is not a representative sample of 
the drugs available in the United States.6
The entire dataset has approximately 915,000 observations for the period 
 1982–2007 for a number of different drugs and acquisition methods. We focus on 
crack cocaine and keep the observations acquired through purchases (i.e., we drop 
seizures) and clean the data of missing values and other unreliable observations, as 
Arkes et al. (2008) suggest. Our quantitative analysis in Section IV uses data for the 
years  2001–2003 because of the time limitations of our other data source, described 
below. Moreover, since our model focuses on retail transactions, we include in our 
estimation sample purchases with a value of less than $200 in real 2003 US$.
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM).—The ADAM dataset (Golub, 
Brownstein, and Dunlap 2012) is a quarterly survey of persons arrested or booked 
on local and state charges in various metropolitan areas in the United States. The 
survey asks questions about the use of drugs and alcohol. The arrestees participate 
in the survey voluntarily under full confidentiality: only about 10 percent of the 
arrestees reject the interview request (Dave 2008). In addition to the interviews, 
participants provide urine samples, which are analyzed for validation of arrestees’ 
 self-reported drug use. Since 2000, the survey includes a drug market procurement 
module, collecting information on the arrestee’s number of drug purchases in the 
6 Horowitz (2001) notes that the time series of drug prices in Washington, DC differ depending on which agency 
collected the data. However, Arkes et al. (2008) show that these inconsistencies disappear almost entirely by con-
trolling for the size of the transaction (above or below 5 grams). Hence, we restrict our analysis to transactions with 
a value below constant 2003 US$200. 
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previous 30 days and whether the last purchase was from a regular dealer.7 We have 
data from the  2001–2003 surveys.
Since ADAM likely oversamples drug users, we complement these two main 
datasets with auxiliary data that allow us to account for selection into the ADAM 
sample. Specifically, the  2001–2003 National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
(United States Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies 2015)—hence-
forth, NSDUH—provides survey data on the use of crack cocaine (as well as other 
illicit drugs) among the  noninstitutionalized US population. Hence, while ADAM 
includes arrestees only, the NSDUH does not include them, thereby sampling the 
complement of the population sampled in the ADAM data. Furthermore, we obtain 
data on arrests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and on the total US popu-
lation from the US census to calculate the aggregate arrest rate of individuals over 
15 years of age in 2002.8
B. Data Description
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables. Panel A refers to the 
STRIDE dataset, panel B to the ADAM dataset, and panel C to the auxiliary data.
Panel A reports some interesting patterns. Because most transactions happen at 
round dollar values (i.e., $50 or $100), the heterogeneity in Price is small relative 
to the heterogeneity in Pure Grams (i.e., the product of Weight and Purity): the 
7 The possible answers also include an “occasional” dealer. In principle, we can explicitly incorporate this 
additional source into our model, and we conjecture that it would not alter sellers’ trade-off between rip-offs versus 
building a customer base. However, this extension would come at the cost of tractability. 
8 Sources: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-32 
and https://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/2000s/vintage_2002/index.html. 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. STRIDE (N = 2,321)
Price (2003 US$) 95.247 48.152 1.052 200.000
Weight (grams) 1.120 1.118 0.004 9.500
Purity (percent) 56.313 28.036 0.000 98.000
Pure grams 0.658 0.722 0.000 6.298
Pure grams per $100 0.622 0.535 0.000 3.931
Panel B. ADAM (N = 64,462)
Obtained crack in last 30 days (percent) 16.899 37.474 0.000 100.000
Purchased from regular dealer (percent) 52.481 49.941 0.000 100.000
Purchases in past 30 days, matched 16.331 11.124 1.000 30.000
Purchases in past 30 days, unmatched 11.548 10.419 1.000 30.000
Panel C. Auxiliary data
Consuming crack in NSDUH (percent) 0.800 8.908 0.000 100.000
Arrest rate (percent) 3.700 — 0.000 100.000
Notes: This table provides summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analy-
sis. Panel A presents summary statistics of the variables obtained from the STRIDE dataset; 
panel B presents summary statistics of the variables obtained from the ADAM dataset; panel C 
presents summary statistics of our auxiliary variables. Drug prices have been deflated using the 
GDP Implicit Price Deflator, with 2003 as the base year.
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 coefficient of variation of Pure Grams is more than twice as large as that of Price.9 
We take the ratio of Pure Grams and Price to construct the variable Pure Grams per 
$100; Figure 1 displays its empirical distribution, which shows substantial varia-
tion, with 15.4 percent of the observations having a value of zero—i.e., complete 
 rip-offs.10 Moreover, there are almost no observations with a positive, but very small 
amount of crack cocaine, suggesting that the distribution features a gap between the 
mass point at 0 and the density of positive qualities (Galenianos, Pacula, and Persico 
2012).
Panel B of Table 1 reports that approximately 17 percent of all arrestees pur-
chased crack cocaine in the past 30 days. Among that group, the average number of 
Purchases in Past 30 Days equals 12.98 (thus, the unconditional average of Purchases 
in Past 30 Days is 9.6), thereby confirming that frequent users account for the vast 
majority of drug expenditures (Kilmer et al. 2014). Of those who purchased crack 
cocaine, 52.5 percent report buying from their regular source. Interestingly, indi-
viduals purchasing from their regular dealers report an average of 16.3 Purchases 
in Past 30 Days, whereas individuals purchasing either from an occasional source 
or from a new source have an average of 11.5 Purchases in Past 30 Days (the  t -sta-
tistics of the difference equals −21.39). The model will interpret this difference as 
different consumption rates between buyers who are currently matched to a seller 
and buyers who are currently not matched, taking into account that buyers’ choice 
of matching with a seller will depend on their preferences for drugs.
9 Some variation in Price across years is due to the fact that we deflate prices. 
10 Galenianos, Pacula, and Persico (2012) report that geographic and temporal variation is not large, contribut-
ing approximately 20 percent to the overall variation. 
Figure 1. Histogram of Pure Grams of Crack Cocaine per $100
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Overall, these two main datasets provide a rich description of the retail crack 
cocaine market and are  well suited for investigating the role of search frictions, 
imperfect observability, and  buyer-seller relationships in this market. Specifically, 
we take the distribution of Pure Grams per $100 displayed in Table 1 as the distribu-
tion that  first-time buyers face, and our model interprets its dispersion as originating 
from both search frictions and imperfect observability, thereby allowing us to calcu-
late the contribution of each to the overall dispersion.11 Moreover, the ADAM data-
set is useful in measuring the frequency of  buyer-seller  long-term relationships and 
buyers’ consumption rates. Furthermore, the auxiliary data reported in panel C con-
firm that ADAM oversamples drug users, as the difference between the fraction of 
individuals consuming crack cocaine in the ADAM dataset and in the NSDUH data-
set, respectively, is large; hence, these auxiliary data allow us to explicitly account 
for sample selection in the estimation. We should point out that, since we compute 
the arrest rate from aggregate data, this statistic has no sampling variability, which 
will affect the confidence intervals of the parameters that depend on this statistic: 
see Section IVB.
Despite all of their advantages, however, the datasets pose some challenges. Most 
importantly, our datasets are  cross-sectional, and, therefore, we do not observe buy-
ers’ and sellers’ behavior over time. Specifically, we do not observe sellers trans-
acting with several buyers or the dynamics of the terms of trade within individual 
 buyer-seller relationships. These limitations imply that a model in which sellers 
discriminate between different buyers, while theoretically feasible, would be diffi-
cult to identify with the available data. Similarly, we do not observe whether sellers 
vary the quality of their offerings during their relationships with buyers, and theory 
argues that quality could either increase or decrease over time (Board and  Meyer-ter 
Vehn 2013). Hence, in the absence of a  more detailed measurement, our model 
(successfully) matches the available data by focusing on heterogeneity across sell-
ers. Moreover, while the theory can accommodate multidimensional heterogeneity 
of buyers and/or sellers, our  cross-sectional data make it difficult to identify such a 
model. Thus, we focus on a parsimonious framework with buyers’ heterogeneity in 
their willingness to pay for drugs and sellers’ heterogeneity in their costs of acquir-
ing pure drugs, and we let other parameters be common across individuals.12 We 
discuss data limitations and their implications for our modeling assumptions further 
in Section V.
III. The Model
We enrich the model of Galenianos, Pacula, and Persico (2012) by introduc-
ing: (i) buyers’ heterogeneity in their preferences for drugs; (ii) sellers’ heteroge-
neity in their costs of supplying drugs; and (iii) a matching function that governs 
 buyer-seller meetings. This richer framework allows the structural estimation to 
capture some key patterns of the data, such as the shape of the distribution of drug 
11 Given STRIDE’s data collection, we believe that sales to regular buyers should account for a minimal share 
of the data, at most. 
12 The empirical labor search literature often makes similar assumptions that some parameters are homoge-
neous, as that literature faces data constraints similar to those in this paper. 
866 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 2017
quality displayed in Figure  1. It also allows our counterfactual analyses to have 
some meaningful margins of adjustment in response to different environments, such 
as the entry (or exit) of buyers and of sellers, as well as their effects on buyers’ and 
sellers’ meeting rates.
A. The Environment
Time runs continuously; the horizon is infinite, and the future is discounted at 
rate  r .
A continuum of potential buyers of measure  
_
 B are characterized by a heteroge-
neous preference parameter  z that determines the instantaneous utility  zq of con-
suming drugs of quality  q .13 Buyers’ marginal utility  z is distributed according to 
a continuous, connected, and  log-concave distribution  
_
 M ( · ) with support  [0,  _ z ] . 
The heterogeneity in  z could arise because of differences in innate preferences or 
because of differences in addictions, as in Becker and Murphy (1988).14 Each buyer 
decides whether to participate in the market. If he does not participate, his pay-
off is 0; if he participates, he pays a flow cost  K B and trades with sellers. Buyers’ 
flow costs, like sellers’ flow costs, discussed below, capture costs imposed on trad-
ers through reduced convenience, ethical constraints, and criminal punishments 
(Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2006). Let  B be the measure of buyers who par-
ticipate in the market and  M( · ) be the distribution of their types. Buyers maximize 
their expected discounted utility.
A continuum of potential sellers of measure  
_
 S are characterized by their hetero-
geneous marginal cost  c , which determines the cost  cq of providing drugs of quality 
q . Sellers’ marginal cost  c is distributed according a continuous and connected dis-
tribution  
_
 D ( · ) with support  [0,  _ c ] . Seller heterogeneity aims to capture differences 
in the cost of acquiring pure drugs, perhaps because of differential connections 
with upstream suppliers. Each seller decides whether to participate in the market, 
in which case he pays a flow cost  K S .15 We denote the measure of participating sell-
ers by  S and the distribution of their types by  D( · ) . These sellers maximize their 
 steady-state profits.
The buyers and sellers who participate in the market meet and trade with each 
other. A buyer is either matched with a seller (his regular seller) or he is unmatched. 
There are two types of meetings: new meetings, where a buyer and a seller meet 
for the first time, and repeat meetings, where a buyer meets with his regular seller. 
Buyers choose whether or not to match with sellers, and sellers choose the quality  q 
that they offer to buyers. In more detail:
 (i) At a new meeting, the buyer pays a fixed price  p and receives drugs of qual-
ity  q . The buyer does not observe the quality  q of the drugs he receives, but 
he learns it perfectly after consuming the drugs. After a new meeting, the 
buyer decides whether to form a match with the new seller. If the buyer is 
currently matched, this means that he severs his connection with his previous 
13 Quality refers to a transaction’s pure quantity. 
14 However, we do not model addiction over and above what buyers’ entry decision captures. 
15 We assume that  
_
 c is large enough so that sellers with the highest costs  
_
 c do not participate in equilibrium. 
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 regular seller. Switching regular sellers leads to the endogenous dissolution 
of matches.
  The function  m(B, S) determines the flow of new meetings;  m(B, S) has 
constant returns to scale, is increasing and concave in both arguments, and 
satisfies  m(0, S) = m(B, 0) = 0 and the Inada conditions. Let  θ =  B __S be 
the  buyer-seller ratio, and let  α B (θ) =  m(B, S) ______B be the rate at which a buyer 
meets with a new seller and  α S (θ) =  m(B, S) ______S the rate at which a seller meets 
with a new buyer. Our assumptions imply that  α B ( · ) is strictly decreasing 
and  α S ( · ) is strictly increasing in  θ .
 (ii) At a repeat meeting, a matched buyer meets with his regular seller. The main 
assumption about sellers’ behavior is that, once they decide on the quality 
level that they offer, they commit to their decision forever.16 That is, a seller 
supplies the same quality at all times, and, as a result, the buyer knows the 
quality that he will receive from a particular seller once he has sampled his 
product. A match dissolves at an exogenous rate  δ , in addition to endogenous 
dissolution.
  The flow of repeat meetings equals  γ , which is the rate at which a matched 
buyer contacts his regular seller.
Buyers decide whether to participate in the market depending on their preference 
z and, if so, their reservation quality when unmatched for matching with a new seller 
(the reservation quality of matched buyers for switching regular sellers is the quality 
that they receive from their current regular seller). Thus, buyers’ actions determine 
the measure of participating buyers  B and the distribution  H( · ) of their reservation 
qualities. Sellers decide whether to participate in the market and, if so, what quality 
to offer in order to maximize their  steady-state profits, depending on their cost  c . 
Thus, sellers’ actions determine the measure of participating sellers  S and the distri-
bution  F( · ) of offered qualities.
We are ready to define the equilibrium.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium consists of the actions of buyers  {B, H( · )} and the 
actions of sellers  {S, F( · )} such that entry, reservation qualities, and offered quali-
ties are chosen optimally and the market is in steady state.
B. The Buyers
We derive buyers’ optimal actions, taking as given the distribution of offered 
qualities  F( · ) and the number of participating sellers  S .
16 See Section II for a discussion of the difficulties of identifying a model with alternative assumptions. 
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An unmatched buyer with preference  z meets a new seller at rate  α B (θ) . At 
the meeting, he pays price  p and receives quality  x , which, from an  ex ante point 
of view, is a random drawn from  F( · ) . If the quality level  x exceeds his reserva-
tion  R z , the buyer matches with the seller, thereby obtaining capital gain  V z (x) −  _ V z , 
where  V z (x) is the value of being matched with a seller offering  x , and  _ V z is the value 
of being unmatched. The value of an unmatched type- z buyer satisfies
(1)  r  _ V z =  α B (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) +  ∫  R  z   _ q  ( V z (x) −  _ V z ) dF(x) − p) .
A type- z buyer participates in the market if and only if  r  _ V z ≥  K B .
A buyer with preference  z who is matched with a seller offering quality  q , may 
experience three events: (i) at rate  γ , he meets his regular seller, pays  p and receives 
q ; (ii) at rate  δ , an exogenous shock destroys his match, and the buyer becomes 
unmatched, obtaining a (negative) capital gain  _ V z −  V z (q) ; and (iii) at rate  α B (θ) , 
he meets a new seller, pays  p and receives quality  x , drawn from the quality distribu-
tion  F( · ) . If the new seller’s quality exceeds  q , then the buyer matches with the new 
seller and leaves his current seller, thereby obtaining capital gain  V z (x) −  V z (q) . The 
value of a type- z buyer matched with a seller offering  q satisfies
(2)  r  V z (q)  =  γ(zq  −  p)  +   α B (θ) (z   ∫ 0  
_
 q  x  dF(x)  +   ∫ q  _ q  ( V z (x)  −   V z (q))  dF(x)  −  p) 
 + δ ( _ V z −  V z (q)) .
The proposition characterizes buyers’ decision to participate and their reservation 
qualities.
PROPOSITION 1: Given  F( · ) and  θ :
 (i) The value of participating in the market for an unmatched type- z buyer 
satisfies
  (3)  r  _ V z =  α B (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) + z  ∫  p __z 
 _ q   γ (1 − F(x))  ________________  
r + δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dx − p) .
 (ii) The optimal reservation quality for an unmatched type- z buyer is
  (4)  R z =  p __z . 
 (iii) There exists  z ˆ(F, θ) such that a type- z buyer participates in the market if and 
only if  z ≥  z ˆ(F, θ) .
PROOF: 
Proofs of all propositions of Section III are in Appendix A.
Notice that the reservation quality is decreasing in buyers’ marginal utility. For 
a given  q , a buyer’s utility from consuming is increasing in  z and, thus, so is his 
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 willingness to match with the seller who offers  q . Therefore, while  γ is homoge-
neous across buyers, buyers with higher taste for drugs endogenously meet their 
regular suppliers more frequently than buyers with a lower taste. Furthermore,  R z 
does not depend on the distribution of offered qualities,  F( · ) , because the arrival 
rate of new sellers is the same when matched and unmatched.
We now aggregate buyers’ decisions, thereby obtaining the measure of partici-
pating buyers and the  buyer-seller ratio  θ . We have the following characterization 
of the market.
PROPOSITION 2: Given  F( · ) and  S :
 (i) If  p ≥  _ z  ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) , then there is no buyer entry:  B = 0 .
 (ii) If  p <  _ z  ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) , then there is a unique marginal buyer type  z ∗ ≤  _ z 
such that buyers with  z ≥  z ∗ participate in the market and buyers with 
z <  z ∗ do not.
 (iii) The marginal buyer type is given by the solution to
 (5)  α B  (  
_ B (1 −  _ M ( z ∗ ))  __________
S
 ) 
×  ⎛ ⎜
⎝
z ∗  ∫ 
0
  
_ q  x dF(x) +  z ∗  ∫ p/ z ∗   _ q   γ (1 − F(x))   ____________________________  
r + δ +  α B  (  
_
 B (1 −   M ( z ∗ ))  __________
S
 ) (1 − F(x))
dx − p⎞ ⎟
⎠
=  K B . 
The proposition’s results are intuitive. If the average quality in the market is low 
enough that the most eager buyer receives no surplus from a purchase, then no buy-
ers enter the market.17 Otherwise, there is a unique marginal type such that buyers 
enter only if their marginal utility of consuming drugs is higher than the marginal 
type’s.
We now describe the distribution of buyer types and reservation qualities. Let 
z(R) denote the buyer type whose reservation quality equals  R . Rearranging equa-
tion (4), we have
  z (R) =  p __R . 
Moreover, note that  R z(R) = R and  z ≤ z(R) ⇔  R z ≥ R . Given  z ∗ , the equilib-
rium distribution of reservation qualities mirrors the distribution of marginal utili-
ties. The corollary summarizes the results.
COROLLARy 1: The marginal buyer type  z ∗ completely characterizes buyers’ 
behavior.
17 Though intuitive, this is not immediate because the option value of climbing the quality ladder needs to be 
taken into account. 
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 (i) The measure of buyers in the market is
  B =  _ B (1 −  _ M ( z ∗ )) . 
 (ii) The distribution of reservation qualities in the market retains the  log-concavity 
of  
_
 M ( · ) and satisfies
  H (R) =  
⎧
 
⎪
⎨⎪
⎩
0
 
if R ≤  R _
    1 −  
_
 M ( p __R)  ________
1 −   M ( z ∗ )  if R ∈ [ R _,  
_
 R ],  
1 if R ≥  _ R 
 
  where  R _ =  R  _ z  =  p __z and  
_
 R =  R  z ∗  =  p __  z ∗ .
C. The Sellers
We derive sellers’ optimal actions, taking as given the marginal buyer type  z ∗ , 
which determines the measure  B of buyers who participate and the distribution of 
reservation qualities  H( · ) .
 Steady-state profits of a type- c seller offering quality  q are
  π c (q) = t(q)( p − cq) ,
where  t(q) denotes the  steady-state flow of transactions when offering  q , and 
p − cq is the margin per transaction. A type- c seller enters the market if and only 
if  π c ( q ∗ (c)) ≥  K S , where  q ∗ (c) denotes the quality level that maximizes his 
 steady-state profits.
An individual seller’s transactions come from two sources: new buyers, who pur-
chase from that seller for the first time, and repeat buyers, who purchased from 
that seller in the past and decided to match with him. The flow of transactions is 
t(q) =  t N +  t R (q) , where  t N represents sales to new buyers, and  t R (q) represents 
sales to the seller’s regular buyers.  Steady-state profits, therefore, equal
  π c (q) = ( t N +  t R (q))( p − cq) .
The flow of new transactions equals the rate at which new buyers contact an indi-
vidual seller, which does not depend on the quality offered:
  t N =  α S (θ) = θ α B (θ) .
The flow of repeat transactions to a seller who offers quality  q depends on the 
number of regular buyers, denoted by  l(q) , and the rate  γ at which these buyers 
contact their regular seller:
  t R (q) = γ l(q) .
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Unlike new transactions, the flow of repeat transactions depends on the seller’s 
offered quality. A seller who offers quality  q gains regular customers when he meets 
with unmatched buyers whose reservation is below  q and with matched buyers 
whose regular seller offers less than  q . Similarly, he loses his regular customers 
when they meet with a seller offering quality greater than  q and when the match 
exogenously dissolves, which happens at rate  δ .
We characterize sellers’ optimal actions in three steps. First, we derive some nec-
essary conditions for the distribution of offered qualities. Second, we derive an indi-
vidual seller’s profits. Third, we characterize the full distribution of offered qualities 
and sellers’ entry decisions.
In equilibrium, the quality distribution displays the following features.
LEMMA 1: In equilibrium, the quality distribution  F( · ) is continuous on  [0,  _ q ] 
and has support on a subset of  {0} ∪ [ q _,  _ q ] ; the support is connected on  [ q _,  _ q ] for 
some  q _ ∈ [ R _,  _ R ] .
We can derive the  steady-state profits of a type- c seller, given the actions of buy-
ers and of other sellers.
PROPOSITION 3: Given  H( · ) ,  θ, and  F( · ) , the  steady-state profits of a type- c 
seller who offers quality  q are
  π c (q) =  
⎧
 ⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 α B (θ)θ  (1 +  γ δH(q)  _________________  (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q))) 2 ) (p − cq) if q ≥  R _    
 α B (θ)θp
 
if q <  R _
. 
We can then characterize sellers’ optimal decisions, given the measure of buyers 
B and their reservation distribution  H( · ) .
PROPOSITION 4: Given  B and  H( · ) :
 (i) A positive measure of sellers offers positive quality in the market. 
There is a unique marginal seller type  c ∗ such that sellers with  c ≤  c ∗ 
enter the market and offer quality  q ∗ (c) > 0 , which is strictly decreasing 
in  c .
 (ii) Measure  S 0 of sellers offers zero quality;  S 0 > 0 if and only if the measure of 
potential sellers is below some threshold.
The subsequent quantitative analysis will focus on the case in which cheating 
occurs in equilibrium ( S 0 > 0 ), as this is the empirically relevant case.
Proposition 4 illustrates the importance of imperfect observability of quality and 
moral hazard for market outcomes: sellers with a high cost of providing drugs par-
ticipate in the market but specialize in cheating their buyers—i.e., they offer zero 
quality—and still retain a positive flow of sales. In a market with perfect observabil-
ity of quality, such sellers would not be in the market.
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COROLLARy 2: Seller behavior is summarized as follows:
 (i) The measure of sellers in the market is  S =  _ S  _ D ( c ∗ ) +  S 0 .
 (ii) The distribution of sellers who offer positive quality is  D(c) =   
_
 D (c) ____  D ( c ∗ ) for 
c ≤  c ∗ .
 (iii) The quality distribution is  F(q) = 1 − (1 − F(0))D( q ∗−1 (q)) for  q > 0 
and  F(0) =   S 0  __S .
D. Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a fixed point on the marginal buyer type. Given  z ∗ , the measure 
of participating buyers  B and the distribution of their reservations  H( · ) are uniquely 
determined (Corollary 1). This, in turn, determines the marginal seller type  c ∗ , the 
measure of sellers who enter the market  S (Proposition 4), and the quality distri-
bution  F( · ) (Corollary 2). Finally,  F( · ) and  S determine the marginal buyer type 
(Proposition 2, equation (5)). The marginal type is defined on a closed and bounded 
set  [0,  _ z ] , and Proposition 5 follows.
PROPOSITION 5: An equilibrium exists.
IV. Empirical Analysis
The model does not admit an analytic solution for all endogenous outcomes. 
Hence, we choose the parameters that best match moments of the data with the cor-
responding moments computed from the model’s numerical solution. We then study 
the quantitative implications of the model evaluated at the estimated parameters.
A. Parametric Assumptions
We estimate the model using the data described in Section II, assuming that they 
are generated from the model’s steady state. We further assume that the empirical 
quality distribution obtained from STRIDE corresponds to the distribution  F( · ) that 
 first-time buyers face. We set the unit of time to be one month, as this is the period 
over which we observe consumption frequencies in ADAM.
Unfortunately, the data lack some detailed information to identify all parameters. 
Therefore, we fix some values. Specifically, the discount rate  r is traditionally diffi-
cult to identify, and we set it to  r = 0.01. Moreover, since we use the normalized 
variable Pure Grams per $100, we set the price equal to  p = $100 . Furthermore, we 
set sellers’ monthly flow cost  K S to be  $1,500, which is broadly in line with the bot-
tom of the distribution of drug dealers’ earnings reported by Levitt and Venkatesh 
(2000).
We further make parametric assumptions about the distributions of buyers’ and 
sellers’ heterogeneity. We borrow these assumptions from the papers that structurally 
estimate search models of the labor market. Notably, the shape of the drug quality 
distribution displayed in Figure 1 resembles the shape of the wage  distribution—i.e., 
873GALENIANOS AND GAVAZZA: THE RETAIL MARKET FOR ILLICIT DRUGSVOL. 107 NO. 3
it is approximately log-normal with a long tail. However, there are two important 
differences: (i) the quality distribution displays the spike at zero—thus our focus 
on sellers’ moral hazard to explain it; and (ii) the quality distribution is a distribu-
tion of offers ( F( · ) in our notation), whereas the wage distribution is a distribution 
of accepted offers ( G( · ) in our notation). Some papers that structurally estimate 
search models of the labor market based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998), such as 
Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999), use a log-normal distribution for work-
ers’ productivity and a Pareto distribution for firm productivity. Hence, given the 
similarities in modeling frameworks and empirical targets, we choose a log-normal 
distribution for buyers and a Pareto distribution for sellers, as well.
More precisely, we assume that the distribution  
_
 M ( · ) of buyers’ taste for crack 
cocaine  z is a mixture distribution: a fraction  λ has taste  z = 0 , so they will never 
enter the market; a fraction  1 − λ has taste  z that follows a log-normal distribution 
with unknown parameters  μ z and  σ z and, for consistency with our theoretical model, 
is truncated above at the upper bound  
_
 z that satisfies  log ( _ z ) =  μ z + 3  σ z . Hence, 
the maximum number of active buyers is  (1 − λ) _ B .18 Since the reservation quality 
of a buyer with type  z > 0 is  R z =  p __z , it follows that the distribution  H( · ) of reser-
vation qualities is also log-normal with parameters  μ R = log p −  μ z and  σ R =  σ z .
Moreover, we assume that the distribution of the inverse of sellers’ costs  1/c is 
a Pareto distribution with lower bound  1 _ _ c and shape parameter  ξ ≥ 1 . This implies 
that the distribution of costs  c is
(6)  _ D (c) =  ( c __   c ) 
ξ , c ∈  [0,  _ c ] ,
and, thus, the truncated distribution of active sellers’ costs equals
  D (c) =  ( c __  c ∗ ) 
ξ , c ∈  [0,  c ∗ ] , 
where  c ∗ is the cost of the marginal active seller that offers the lowest quality level  q _ . 
The shape parameter  ξ captures the dispersion of costs. If  ξ = 1 , the cost distribu-
tion is uniform. As  ξ increases, the relative number of  high-cost sellers increases, 
and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher cost levels. As  ξ goes 
to infinity, the cost distribution becomes degenerate at the upper bound.19
We further assume that drug qualities  q and the number of purchases are mea-
sured with errors. Specifically, we assume that the reported qualities  q ˆ and the true 
qualities  q are related as:  q ˆ = qϵ, where  ϵ is a measurement error, drawn from a 
log-normal distribution with parameters  ( μ ϵ ,  σ ϵ ) , and with mean to equal 1—i.e., 
18 An alternative rationalization of the total size of the market is that buyers have heterogeneous flow costs  K B , 
and buyers with high  K B do not enter the market. However, we should point out that buyers’ flow cost  K B affects 
only their entry decision, whereas the value of  z additionally affects their consumption. Hence, the heterogeneity 
of buyers’ consumption observed in the data is directly informative about (i.e., identifies) the heterogeneity of 
preferences  z . 
19 In the absence of the measurement error  ϵ specified below, we could nonparametrically estimate the distribu-
tion  D (c) from the empirical distribution of  q for  q > 0 , as  D (c) =  1 − F (q)  _______
1 − F(0) . However, a parametric distribution 
for  D (c) facilitates the counterfactual out-of-sample analyses of Section IVD. 
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measurements are unbiased; hence, the parameters  ( μ ϵ ,  σ ϵ ) , satisfy  μ ϵ = − 0.5  σ ϵ 2. 
Similarly, we assume that the reported number of purchases depends on the product 
of the true number of purchases and a measurement error  ν , which is independent 
of  ϵ , and drawn from a log-normal distribution with parameters  ( μ ν ,  σ ν ) , and with 
mean equal to 1: hence,  μ ν = − 0.5  σ ν 2. Moreover, to preserve the discreteness of 
the reported number of purchases, we round the resulting product of the true number 
of purchases and the measurement error  ν to the nearest integer.
The assumption of measurement error on wages is quite common in the literature 
that structurally estimates search models of the labor market. In our application, 
it is plausible that drug quality is measured with error in STRIDE. Measurement 
error could also account for some unobserved seller behavior that the model does 
not consider (i.e., price discrimination), thereby allowing us to fit the quality distri-
bution better. For example, as Lemma 1 highlights, the model implies a gap in the 
quality distribution between the complete  rip-offs  q ∗ = 0 and the minimum posi-
tive quality  q _ . Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution displays this qualitative 
feature, and the measurement  ϵ allows it to more precisely match its magnitude; 
the figure also shows that the quality distribution displays a long right tail, and the 
measurement  ϵ allows the model to capture some of these  high-quality transactions. 
Similarly, the measurement error on the number of purchases can account for the 
fact that respondents to the ADAM survey may have imperfect (although not sys-
tematically biased) recall of their recent purchases; in addition, it allows us to better 
fit moments of the distribution of the number of purchases.
Finally, we explicitly model the selection into the ADAM sample. Specifically, 
we assume that an individual who does not consume drugs is in ADAM if  η ≥ 0 , 
irrespective of his type  z , whereas an individual of type  z who consumes drugs is 
in ADAM if  log (z) + η ≥ 0 , where  η is a random variable that is independent of 
z and is distributed according to a normal distribution with mean  μ η and standard 
deviation  σ η . Hence, this selection process highlights that users are more likely to 
be in ADAM than  nonusers, and that buyers with higher preferences for drugs (and, 
thus, greater drug consumption) are more likely to be in the ADAM dataset than 
buyers with lower preferences (and, thus, lower consumption). Appendix B reports 
the details of the derivation of the density of drug users’ preferences  z in ADAM; we 
will use this density to compute simulated moments that we match to their empirical 
counterparts.
B. Estimation and Identification
We estimate the vector  ψ =  { α B , γ, δ,  K B ,  μ z ,  σ z ,  c ∗ , ξ,  σ ϵ ,  σ ν ,  μ η ,  σ η , λ} 
using a  minimum-distance estimator that matches key moments of the data with the 
corresponding moments of the model.20 More precisely, for any value of the vector 
ψ , we solve the model of Section III to find its equilibrium: the mass  B of active 
buyers and their distribution of reservation qualities  H( · ), and the mass  S of active 
sellers and their distribution  F( · ) of offered qualities. We then calculate two sets of 
20 While  α B is the endogenous rate of new meetings and  c ∗ is the cost of the marginal seller that (endogenously) 
offers the lowest quality level  q _ , we can infer them from the data, and this inference, along with additional assump-
tions, allows us to perform counterfactual analyses, as we explain in Section IVD. 
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moments, one that we match to a set of moments computed from the STRIDE data-
set and one that we match to a set of moments computed from the ADAM dataset.
The first set  m 1 (ψ) is composed of these moments of the offered quality distri-
bution  F( · ) :
 (i) The fraction of  rip-offs  q =  q ˆ = 0 .
 (ii) The mean of quality for  q ˆ > 0 .
 (iii) The standard deviation of quality for  q ˆ > 0 .
 (iv) The median of quality for  q ˆ > 0 .
 (v) The skewness of quality for  q ˆ > 0 .
 (vi) The kurtosis of quality for  q ˆ > 0 .
Moreover, at each value of the parameters, we simulate  buyer-seller meetings 
and consumption patterns (i.e., the  α B ,  δ , and  γ shocks), using the distributions 
of preferences  z and  buyer-seller matches that take into account the selection into 
ADAM (see Appendix B). We then compute the second set  m 2 (ψ) composed of 
these moments:
 (i) The fraction of individuals who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days;
 (ii) The fraction of users who made their last purchase from their regular dealer, 
among those who purchased crack cocaine in the last 30 days (in the simula-
tion, a purchase from a regular dealer is defined as a purchase from the same 
seller as the previous purchase);
 (iii) The average number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in 
the last 30 days and made their last purchase from their regular dealer;
 (iv) The average number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine in 
the last 30 days and did not make their last purchase from their regular dealer;
 (v) The standard deviation of the number of purchases of those who purchased 
crack cocaine in the last 30 days and made their last purchase from their reg-
ular dealer;
 (vi) The standard deviation of the number of purchases of those who purchased 
crack cocaine in the last 30 days and did not make their last purchase from 
their regular dealer;
 (vii) The median of the number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine 
in the last 30 days and made their last purchase from their regular dealer;
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 (viii) The median of the number of purchases of those who purchased crack cocaine 
in the last 30 days and did not make their last purchase from their regular 
dealer.
We add to this set two moments calculated from our auxiliary data that identify 
the parameters that determine the selection into the ADAM sample and the fraction 
λ of the population who has no taste for crack cocaine:
 (ix) The fraction of individuals aged 15 and older who report consuming crack 
cocaine in the  2001–2003 NSDUH. Equation (B2) in Appendix B derives the 
analytical formula for this fraction.
 (x) The fraction of individuals arrested. Equation (B1) in Appendix B derives the 
analytical formula for this fraction.
The  minimum-distance estimator chooses the parameter vector  ψ that minimizes 
the criterion function,
  (m(ψ) −  m S )′ Ω (m(ψ) −  m S ), 
where  m (ψ) =  [  m 1 (ψ)   m 2 (ψ) ] is the vector of stacked moments computed from the 
model evaluated at  ψ,  m S is the vector of corresponding sample moments, and  Ω is 
a symmetric,  positive-definite matrix; in practice, we use a diagonal matrix whose 
elements are those on the main diagonal of the inverse of the matrix  E ( m S ′  m S ) .
The identification of the model is similar to that of structural search models of 
the labor market that follow the framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998); see, 
for example, Bontemps, Robin, and Van den Berg (1999). Specifically, although the 
model is highly nonlinear, so that (almost) all parameters affect all outcomes, the 
identification of some parameters relies on some key moments in the data.
The moments of the quality distribution identify the parameters of the distribution 
D( · ) of sellers’ heterogeneity and of the distribution of the measurement error ϵ on 
drug quality, and they contribute to the identification of the parameters of the distri-
bution  M( · ) of buyers’ heterogeneity. More precisely, in the absence of measurement 
error on  q , the empirical distribution of  q for  q > 0  nonparametrically identifies the 
distribution  D(c) since Corollary 2 shows that  F(q) = 1 − (1 − F(0)) D( q ∗−1 (q)) 
for  q > 0 . Moreover, as in structural search models of the labor market, the 
data sometimes display events that should not occur according to the model, and 
these  zero-probability events identify the parameters of the distributions of the 
measurement errors. In search models of the labor markets, these events include 
 job-to-job transitions that feature a wage decrease, for example; instead, our model 
implies a gap in the quality distribution between  q = 0 and  q _ that is larger than that 
observed in the data—i.e., no seller offers a small positive quality, as this quality 
is strictly more expensive than zero quality and does not induce buyers to purchase 
again from the seller offering it—and this gap identifies the parameter  σ ϵ of the 
distribution of  ϵ .
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The moments of buyers’ consumptions identify the meeting rates  α B and  γ , the 
destruction rate  δ, the parameter  σ ν of the distribution of the measurement error on 
the number of purchases, and they contribute to the identification of the parame-
ters of the distribution  M( · ) of buyers’ heterogeneity. Specifically, the difference 
between the average number of purchases of those who made their last purchase 
from their regular dealer and of those who did not identify the parameter  γ , whereas 
the fraction of users who made their last purchase for their regular dealer and the 
unconditional average number of purchases jointly identify the meeting rates  α B and 
the destruction rate  δ . The moments of the distribution of the number of purchases 
contribute to the identification of the parameters of the distribution  M( · ) of buyers’ 
heterogeneity and identify the parameter  σ ν of the distribution of the measurement 
error  ν on the number of purchases. In particular, the model without this measure-
ment error cannot fully account for the observed heterogeneity in (i.e., the standard 
deviation of) the number of purchases across individuals, and the measurement error 
ν allows the empirical model to match this feature of the data; thus, this difference 
between the theory and the data identifies the parameter  σ ν of the distribution of  ν .21
Finally, the fraction of individuals who purchased crack cocaine in the last 
30 days in the ADAM data, the fraction of individuals consuming crack cocaine in 
the NSDUH, and the arrest rate identify the fraction  λ of individuals who have taste 
z = 0 for drugs, as well as the parameters of the distribution of the unobservable 
η that contributes to the selection into the ADAM sample.22 Using the estimated 
distribution of buyers’ preferences, we then recover buyers’ cost  K B from the entry 
condition of the marginal buyer, equation (5).
Estimates and Model Fit.—Table 2 reports estimates of the parameters, along 
with  95 percent confidence intervals obtained by bootstrapping the data using 
100 replications.
The value of  α B indicates that a buyer meets a new seller, on average, approx-
imately every  30 __ α B ≈ 24 days. The value of  γ indicates that a matched buyer pur-
chases, on average, approximately 19 times per month. However, the  buyer-seller 
match exogenously breaks, on average, every  30 __δ = 41 days.23 Buyers’ monthly 
cost  K B is quite low, approximately  $150. 
The estimates of the parameters of the distribution of buyers’ heterogeneity imply 
that 98 percent of individuals have taste  z equal to zero, and, thus, the market for 
crack cocaine is limited in size, presumably because crack cocaine is one of the 
most addictive and dangerous drugs. Of those individuals with positive  preferences, 
82 percent are active in the market, which corresponds to buyers with taste 
21 If addicted individuals are those whose number of purchases in ADAM exceeds a threshold, we could under-
stand how the presence of addicts affects our results by estimating our model on a sample without these individuals 
(Jacobi and Sovinsky 2016). As a result of this removal, the average and the standard deviation of the number of 
purchases will be lower than those reported in Table 1. Hence, the parameter  γ and the standard deviation  σ ν of the 
measurement error  ν will likely be lower than those reported in Table 2. However, we believe that the key impli-
cations of the model will be unaffected, as the model and the counterfactuals do not depend on the specific values 
of  γ and  σ ν . 
22 Since we calculate the arrest rate using aggregate data, this moment has no sampling variability. Hence, the 
confidence intervals of the estimates of  λ ,  μ η , and  σ η do not depend on the sampling variability of the arrest rate, 
but exclusively on the sampling variability of the moments that identify the distribution of the taste  z . See Imbens 
and Lancaster (1994) on combining moments from different samples. 
23 Reuter et al. (1990) reports evidence consistent with high turnover of buyer-seller relationships. 
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z ≥  z ∗ = 150.71 ; among those active buyers, the average taste is approximately 
equal to 175 and the standard deviation 16. The value of  c ∗ and of the shape parame-
ter  ξ of sellers’ cost distribution imply that the range of costs of sellers offering pos-
itive quality is  [0, 124.37] , but their average cost is  118.56 , as  ξ = 20.44 implies 
that almost all these sellers have costs quite close to the cost  c ∗ of the marginal seller 
that offers the lowest quality level  q _ . The comparison between buyers’ average val-
uation and sellers’ average cost implies that the surplus of each pure gram traded 
equals approximately $55. Moreover, the density of buyers’ preferences evaluated 
at the entry threshold  z ∗ and the density of sellers’ costs evaluated at the threshold  c ∗ 
imply that the demand for drugs is substantially less elastic than the supply.
Finally, we estimate that  σ ϵ equals 0.52, which means that the variance of the 
measurement error on drug quality equals 0.32. This value, along with those of the 
other estimates, implies that the model without measurement error  ϵ accounts for 
approximately 60 percent of the dispersion of drug quality observed in the data, and 
that the error  ϵ improves the fit, in particular by “filling the gap” between  q = 0 
and  q _ = 0.63 , and by rationalizing the highest- q transactions.24 Similarly, we esti-
mate that  σ ν equals 0.52, which means that the variance of the measurement error on 
the number of purchases equals 0.31. The parameters imply that the model without 
measurement error accounts for approximately 75 percent of the dispersion of drug 
quality; the measurement error  ν increases this dispersion, thereby improving the fit.
Table 3 presents a comparison between the empirical moments and the moments 
calculated from the model at the estimated parameters. Overall, the model matches 
the moments of the quality distribution well: most notably, it perfectly captures 
the fraction of  rip-offs and the average quality of drugs. Similarly, the model per-
fectly captures the difference in consumption rates between matched and unmatched 
 buyers, as well as the fraction of matched buyers. Moreover, the model exactly 
matches the fraction of individuals purchasing crack cocaine in the ADAM sample, 
24 Of course, if we estimate the model without measurement error, the estimated variance of  q increases. 
Table 2—Estimates
 α B 1.267  λ 0.982
 [1.217, 1.267]  [0.980, 0.983] 
 γ 19.399  μ z 5.118
 [18.868, 20.658]  [5.097, 5.137] 
 δ 0.731  σ z 0.114
 [0.700, 0.734]  [0.103, 0.125] 
 K B 152.639  c ∗ 124.368
 [112.710, 166.035]  [123.597, 128.681] 
 σ ϵ 0.526  ξ 20.443
 [0.457, 0.572]  [20.443, 31.284] 
 σ η 2.803  μ η −5.237
 [2.723, 2.852]  [− 5.329, − 5.103] 
 σ ν 0.522
 [0.479, 0.548] 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of the parameters. Ninety-five per-
cent confidence intervals in brackets are obtained by bootstrapping the data 
using 100 replications.
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the fraction of individuals consuming crack cocaine in the NSDUH, as well as the 
arrest rate, indicating that our empirical model captures the  over-representation of 
drug users in the ADAM sample very well.
C. Model Implications
The estimated parameters reported in Table 2 imply that 15.6 percent of all sell-
ers rip their buyers off by choosing  q = 0. For sellers with costs  0 ≤ c ≤  c ∗ 
= 124.37,  q ∗ (c) is the solution to the differential equation (A5) in Appendix A: 
sellers’ quality choices are strictly decreasing in their costs, as Proposition 4 says.
Sellers’ quality choice  q ∗ (c) implies that sellers’ markups  p − c  q ∗ (c)  _______p are 
 nonmonotonic in  c , with the lowest- and  highest-cost sellers charging the highest 
markups (equal to 1, as either  c or  q equals 0), and the seller with cost  c = 114.92 
charging the lowest one; the average sellers’ markup  
 ∫ 0  
_
 c  (p − c  q ∗ (c) ) dD (c)   ____________p equals 
13.43 percent.25 On average, sellers make approximately 175 transactions  t (q) 
per month, and the distribution of transactions  t (q) has a large range—the 
 lowest-quality (i.e.,  highest-cost) sellers make approximately 70 monthly deals, 
and the  highest-quality sellers make approximately 410 monthly deals—and is 
skewed toward sellers with fewer transactions. Sellers’ profits have a large range 
and are highly skewed, as well: the  lowest-quality seller earns  $1,500 per month; 
the  highest-quality seller earns approximately  $13,000 per month; and the average 
25 The STRIDE data allow us to corroborate these estimates of dealers’ costs/margins. Specifically, while it 
is not straightforward to define the wholesale market (and know how it works; for example, we may also need to 
consider the role of long-term relationships in the wholesale market), we use powder cocaine as the main input of 
crack cocaine and assume that retail sellers buy powder cocaine in transactions of values between $200 and $1,000, 
which implies an approximate average value of $500. Assuming that transactions in STRIDE are representative of 
this wholesale market, we obtain an average cost of a pure gram of powder cocaine of $111.96 and, thus, an average 
margin of approximately 12 percent. Hence, these values are quite close to our estimated average costs and margins. 
Table 3—Model Fit
Data Model
Fraction of  rip-offs (percent) 15.338 15.862
Average pure grams per $100,  q ˆ > 0 0.735 0.732
Standard deviation pure grams per $100,  q ˆ > 0 0.505 0.416
Median pure grams per $100,  q ˆ > 0 0.591 0.635
Skewness pure grams per $100,  q ˆ > 0 1.952 1.870
Kurtosis pure grams per $100,  q ˆ > 0 8.516 9.521
Fraction obtained drug in last 30 days (percent) 16.900 16.899
Fraction last purchased from regular dealer (percent) 52.481 52.960
Average number of purchases, matched buyer 16.331 16.771
Average number of purchases, unmatched buyer 11.548 10.756
Standard deviation number of purchases, matched buyer 11.124 11.477
Standard deviation number of purchases, unmatched buyer 10.419 10.337
Median number of purchases, matched buyer 15.000 14.000
Median number of purchases, unmatched buyer 7.000 7.000
Fraction consuming drug in NSDUH (percent) 0.800 0.800
Arrest rate (percent) 3.776 3.775
Note: This table reports the values of the empirical moments and of the simulated moments 
calculated at the estimated parameters reported in Table 2.
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seller earns approximately  $2,300 . The shape of the distribution of profits matches 
the evidence reported by Reuter et al. (1990) and Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) rea-
sonably well.
The distribution  G(q) of qualities from which matched buyers consume differs 
substantially from the distribution  F(q) of qualities from which unmatched buy-
ers consume. The distribution  F(q) displays the key features of the distribution of 
qualities characterized in Lemma 1, most notably the mass point at zero quality. Of 
course, no matched buyer purchases zero quality from his regular dealer; hence, 
while approximately 15 percent of sellers offer  zero-quality drugs, the fraction of all 
transactions that feature zero quality equals  
B  α B × F(0)  __________  (B  α B + B −  _ n ) γ = 1.57 percent only, 
as all  B active buyers consume at rate  α B , and  (B −  _ n ) matched buyers addition-
ally consume drugs with strictly positive quality at rate  γ , whereas only the share 
F(0) of the former transactions features zero quality. Moreover, as buyers move 
up over time in the offered quality distribution by switching to sellers that offer 
 higher-quality drugs, they are more likely to be matched to  higher-quality sellers. 
Hence, the cumulative  G (q)  first-order stochastically dominates the cumulative  F (q) . 
Matched buyers consume drugs that have an average quality of  ∫  q _ 
_
 q  qg (q) dq = 0.76, 
whereas unmatched buyers consume drugs that have an average quality of 
 ∫ 0  
_
 q  q f  (q) dq = 0.62, indicating that buyers’ switching behavior and  buyer-seller 
relationships allow regular buyers to consume drugs that are, on average,  23 percent 
better than the drugs that  first-time buyers consume.
D. Counterfactual Analyses
In this section, we use our model to quantitatively analyze two key features of 
illegal markets: (i) the effect of imperfect observability and moral hazard on market 
outcomes; and (ii) the effect of changing penalties on market outcomes.
Both analyses are  out-of-sample and, thus, require that we specify the measure  
_
 B 
of potential buyers and the functional form of the matching function  m(B, S) that 
determines the aggregate number of new meetings between  B active buyers and  S 
active sellers. We can further determine the number of active sellers in each counter-
factual from sellers’ free entry conditions—i.e., equation (C2) in online Appendix C 
in the first counterfactual on observability, and equation (A2) in Appendix A in the 
second counterfactual on penalties, respectively.26
We set the measure  
_
 B of potential buyers to 228 million, which, as we men-
tioned when reporting the fraction of individuals arrested, is the US population over 
15 years of age reported in July 2002 (the midpoint of our sample period) by the 
US census.
We further assume a  Cobb-Douglas functional form for the matching function:
  m(B, S) = ω  B 1/2  S 1/2 , 
26 Thus, we do not need to specify the measure  
_
 S of potential sellers, as sellers’ free entry condition determines 
the number of active sellers in each counterfactual case. 
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where  ω is the efficiency of the matching function. With our estimated parameters, 
we can calculate  ω as
  ω =  m(B, S) _______ B 1/2  S 1/2  =  
 α B (θ) B _______ B 1/2  S 1/2  , 
where we estimate  α B using the ADAM data, we obtain  B from the fraction of the 
population consuming crack cocaine, and we infer  S from sellers’  free-entry condi-
tion. Online Appendix D reports on the results obtained using alternative matching 
functions, confirming the robustness of the results that we report in this section.
In the following counterfactual analyses, we report quantitative results for the 
population (i.e., without sample selection) as ratios of the corresponding values in 
the baseline case (i.e., a ratio larger than one implies an increase relative to the base-
line case), without measurement errors on drug quality and drug purchases.
The Role of Sellers’ Moral Hazard.—In order to understand the quantitative effect 
of moral hazard on market outcomes, we modify the baseline model by letting buy-
ers observe quality before making a purchase and compute the new equilibrium. 
This counterfactual highlights how the observability of  q affects the interaction 
between buyers and sellers and, thus, the equilibrium distribution of quality  q and 
agents’ participation in the market. Online Appendix C reports the full derivation of 
the equilibrium.
When quality is observable, after observing  q in a new meeting, a buyer has 
two decisions to make: whether to consume and whether to match. Regardless of 
whether or not the buyer is currently matched, he makes a purchase when the instan-
taneous payoff  zq − p is positive. The decision to match is similar to that in the 
baseline model: if matched, the buyer chooses between matching with the new seller 
or returning to his regular seller, after potentially taking advantage of the consump-
tion opportunity; if unmatched, the buyer chooses between matching with the new 
seller and remaining unmatched, as consuming and remaining unmatched is not 
optimal. Hence, the value functions of a type- z buyer satisfy
      r  _ V z =  α B (θ)  ∫ 0  
_ q  max  [z x − p + max  [ V z (x) −  
_
 V z , 0] , 0] dF(x),
  r  V z (q) = γ (zq − p) 
 +  α B (θ)  ∫ 0  
_ q  max  [z x − p + max [ V z (x) −  V z (q), 0], 0] dF(x) + δ  ( _ V z −  V z (q)) .
Simple calculations yield that the reservation quality for consuming is the same as 
the reservation quality for matching (see online Appendix C for details).
Quality observability affects sellers’ payoffs because new buyers make a pur-
chase only if their instantaneous payoff is positive. Therefore, the flow of trans-
actions with new buyers of a seller offering quality  q equals the meeting rate 
with new buyers  α S (θ) times the probability that the buyer’s reservation is below 
 q ,  H(q) :
  t N (q) =  α S (θ)H(q) .
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The flow of sellers’ transactions with regular buyers  t R (q) is determined in an equiv-
alent way to the baseline case (see online Appendix C for details). Thus,  steady-state 
profits are
  π c (q) = ( p − cq)( t N (q) +  t R (q)) . 
Sellers’ incentives differ from those in the baseline case and, thus, their choices 
do as well. Specifically, offering zero quality yields negative instantaneous payoff to 
all buyers and, thus, sellers no longer offer complete  rip-offs. Therefore, the distri-
bution of offered quality does not feature a mass point at zero. More generally, the 
flow of new customers depends on the quality offered since buyers with low levels 
of  z might choose not to purchase from low- q sellers.
As in the baseline model, buyers and sellers choose whether to participate in 
the market, which now has different payoffs due to observable quality. Therefore, 
buyers’ and sellers’ endogenous entry thresholds change relative to the baseline 
case—i.e., they equal  z ∗∗ and  c ∗∗ , characterized in equations (C1) and (C2), respec-
tively, in online Appendix C—thereby determining a different number of active buy-
ers and active sellers relative to the unobservable quality case of Section III (see 
Corollaries 3 and 4).
We quantitatively assess the effect of eliminating moral hazard by computing 
the model’s steady state with observable quality at the estimated parameters. We 
consider two separate cases: (i) a  partial-equilibrium case in which the measures 
of participating buyers and sellers are unchanged relative to the baseline case, 
but they make optimal decisions in the new information environment; and (ii) a 
 general-equilibrium case in which, in addition to the  partial-equilibrium optimi-
zations, buyers and sellers also make optimal entry decisions. We believe that the 
 partial-equilibrium case is useful for focusing exclusively on the effects of moral 
hazard on the distribution of drug quality. The  general-equilibrium case is useful 
because it further illustrates how moral hazard (or the lack thereof) affects agents’ 
incentives to participate in the market.
Table 4 reports market outcomes for the counterfactuals of observable qual-
ity for the  partial-equilibrium case and the  general-equilibrium case. Overall, 
market outcomes differ substantially when buyers observe drug purity and when 
they do not. Moreover, the quantitative effects are very similar in the partial- and 
 general-equilibrium cases. Specifically, the  partial-equilibrium case highlights that, 
relative to the baseline case, the average offered quality increases by approximately 
20 percent, and the standard deviation of quality decreases by approximately 80 per-
cent. Moreover,  zero-purity drugs disappear from the market when quality is observ-
able, as we discussed above. Overall, this counterfactual indicates that unobservable 
quality, rather than search frictions, is the main determinant of the observed disper-
sion of quality. Finally, a larger fraction of buyers are matched to a regular seller, 
thereby increasing their number of purchases and consumption by approximately 5 
and 8 percent, respectively.
The  general-equilibrium case highlights additional effects relative to the 
 partial-equilibrium case. First, buyers receive higher quality than in the baseline 
case, thereby increasing buyers’ participation. Second, the intensified competition 
among sellers reduces their profits relative to the baseline case, thereby decreasing 
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sellers’ participation. As a result, the  buyer-seller ratio increases relative to the base-
line case, attenuating some of the  partial-equilibrium effects. Overall, the increase in 
the number of buyers (by approximately 7 percent), along with the increase in their 
drug consumption (by approximately 3 percent), leads to an increase in the aggre-
gate consumption of pure drugs by approximately 12 percent relative to the baseline 
case. However, some of the estimates are imprecise and, thus, we cannot rule out 
that the  general-equilibrium effects fully offset the  partial-equilibrium effects on 
individual purchases and consumption of active buyers.
The results reported in Table 4 can provide some insights into how outcomes dif-
fer between illegal and legal markets. Buyers’ imperfect information is one key way 
in which our model captures an illegal market because, in legal markets for similar 
commodities (i.e., tea, coffee, cigarettes, alcohol), buyers are better (albeit perhaps 
not fully) informed about the quality of products that they are purchasing. While a 
full legalization counterfactual requires many additional assumptions—for exam-
ple, on the destruction rate  δ , the efficiency of the matching process and the entry 
costs  K B and  K S —our analysis illustrates that the dispersion of quality of drugs will 
decrease and the average quality of drugs will increase if buyers gain better informa-
tion. The reduction in quality dispersion may bring health benefits: Caulkins (2007) 
argues that greater variability in purity predicts overdoses because users inadver-
tently consume more pure drug than they intend to when they purchase drugs that 
are more pure than is typical; at the same time, the increase in average quality may 
increase aggregate consumption and, thus, may bring health costs. However, the 
results in Table 4 suggest that this aggregate increase will not be large, curbing these 
additional costs.
In summary, while we are not aware of any countries currently considering the 
legalization of crack cocaine, we believe that the economic mechanisms that this 
Table 4—Observable Quality
Baseline
Observable  q, 
partial 
equilibrium
Observable  q, 
general 
equilibrium
Fraction of  rip-offs 15.862 0.000 0.000
 (percent)  [13.646; 16.812]  [0.000; 0.000]  [0.000; 0.000] 
Average pure grams 0.616 1.204 1.218
 per $100  [0.597; 0.636]  [1.160; 1.261]  [1.166; 1.218] 
Standard deviation pure 0.271 0.184 0.176
 grams per $100  [0.256; 0.279]  [0.156; 0.287]  [0.142; 0.180] 
Active buyers, in millions 3.431 1.000 1.073
 [3.312; 3.530]  [1.000; 1.000]  [1.042; 1.097] 
Active sellers, in millions 0.290 1.000 0.822
 [0.271; 0.295]  [1.000; 1.000]  [0.809; 0.844] 
Fraction of matched 54.040 1.054 1.031
 buyers (percent)  [52.420; 55.100]  [1.024; 1.109]  [0.985; 1.053] 
Average number of 12.726 1.053 1.013
 purchases per month  [12.228; 13.389]  [1.038; 1.086]  [0.975; 1.028] 
Average pure grams 9.464 1.082 1.042
 consumed per month  [9.057; 9.990]  [1.063; 1.115]  [1.000; 1.055] 
Notes: This table reports market outcomes in the counterfactual cases in which buyers can 
observe drugs’ purity before purchasing, expressed as ratios over the corresponding values in 
the baseline case. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals in brackets.
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counterfactual highlights do not apply exclusively to the crack cocaine market, and, 
thus, this analysis could shed some light on how market outcomes would differ in 
the cases of substances that are currently being legalized.
The Role of Penalties.—The United States has witnessed a large increase in pol-
icies and penalties on buyers and sellers of drugs in the last 30 years. The principal 
aim of these changes has been to disrupt the market for narcotics. Legal penalties on 
drug trade obviously affect sellers’ flow costs  K S and buyers’ costs  K B . Thus, in this 
section, we use our model to understand how these costs  K S and  K B affect sellers’ 
and buyers’ participation and, through it, market outcomes.27
We estimated our model on data from  2001–2003, when penalties were high; 
thus, we now perform two counterfactuals with lower costs. More specifically, in 
the first counterfactual, we decrease sellers’ flow cost  K S by 15 percent (i.e., from 
$1,500 to  $1,275 ) relative to the baseline case of Section III with  ex ante unobserv-
able quality; in the second one, we decrease buyers’ flow cost  K B by 15 percent 
relative to the baseline case. Online Appendix D reports the results with different 
changes to these flow costs.
Table 5 reports the quantitative values of market outcomes for the two counter-
factuals cases, displaying interesting results. With lower penalties on sellers (i.e., a 
drop in  K S ), the effect on market participation is intuitive: the number of sellers is 
approximately  30 percent higher. Thus, the rate  α B (θ) at which buyers meet with 
new sellers is also higher.
The effect on the average offered quality, however, is quite striking: the average 
quality of a new purchase is lower, despite lower sellers’ costs. Two factors account 
for this decrease: (i) a larger value of  α B (θ) means that the match between a buyer 
and a seller is, on average,  shorter-lived. In turn, this reduction lowers sellers’ value 
of forming  long-term relationships with new buyers relative to the value of rip-
ping them off; thus, the proportion of  rip-offs increases. (ii) The new sellers have 
higher average costs than sellers in the baseline case and, thus, sell  low-quality 
drugs. Our quantitative exercise shows that, at the estimated parameter values, the 
proportion of sellers who specialize in  rip-offs is approximately  70 percent higher 
(i.e., it increases to approximately 27 percentage points); the average offered quality 
is  14 percent lower; and the standard deviation is  20 percent higher, as compared to 
the baseline case. Moreover, the fact that relationships are  shorter-lived is quantita-
tively more important than the fact that new sellers have higher costs in accounting 
for these changes in drug quality.
This decrease in drug quality decreases the number of active buyers in the mar-
ket, whereas a higher meeting rate increases it. As a result of these opposing forces, 
the equilibrium number of buyers decreases, by less than 6 percent. Similarly, the 
lower quality of drugs implies that the fraction of matched buyers, their average 
number of purchases, and their average pure quantity of crack consumed decrease. 
27 Different policing interventions affect the market through different parameters. For example, prison sentenc-
ing guidelines more likely affect buyers’ and sellers’ costs, whereas police patrolling more likely affects the destruc-
tion rate  δ and the rate  γ of repeat meetings. Table D1 in online Appendix D reports on additional counterfactuals 
that consider a 20 percent decrease in  δ and a 20 percent increase in  γ , respectively. 
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However, the magnitudes of all these changes are negligible and the confidence 
intervals imply most of them are not statistically different from the baseline results.
Similarly, a  15 percent reduction in buyers’ participation cost  K B leads to an 
increase in the number of buyers. Sellers’  free-entry condition (A2) requires that 
the  buyer-seller ratio equals that of the baseline case. Therefore, a larger number of 
sellers participate in the market than in the baseline case. Since these new sellers 
have higher costs, they have stronger incentives to make quick profits by selling 
q = 0 , decreasing the offered qualities. The last column of Table 5 reports the 
effects on the drug quality distribution: the fraction of  rip-offs increases by 16.2 per-
cent, the average drug quality decreases by 2.8 percent, and the standard deviation 
of drug quality increases by 6.2 percent, relative to the baseline case. However, the 
overall effects on the number of matched buyers, as well as on buyers’ purchases 
and consumptions, are again negligible and statistically indistinguishable from the 
baseline results.
Overall, the results further highlight the role of buyers’ incomplete information 
at the time of purchase, as sellers’ moral hazard is fundamental to this, perhaps, 
counterintuitive relation between lower penalties—sellers’ penalties, in particu-
lar—and lower quality. Specifically, when buyers have perfect information about 
quality in a frictional product market (e.g., the  product-market version of Burdett 
and Mortensen 1998), an increase in buyers’ meeting rate  α B (θ) unambiguously 
increases competition among sellers, thereby leading to an improvement in buyers’ 
terms of trade—i.e., an increase in the average offered quality. Therefore, if entry 
costs  K B or  K S were reduced in a market with full observability, quality and con-
sumption would increase.
Moreover, the results reported in Table 5 indicate that changes in penalties have 
larger effects on the distribution of drugs offered on the market than on buyers’ 
Table 5—The Effect of Penalties
Baseline Lower  K S Lower  K B 
Fraction of  rip-offs (percent) 15.862 1.678 1.162
 [13.646; 16.812]  [1.596; 1.811]  [1.080; 1.209] 
Average pure grams per $100 0.616 0.866 0.972
 [0.597; 0.636]  [0.852; 0.877]  [0.950; 0.983] 
Standard deviation pure grams 0.271 1.195 1.062
 per $100  [0.256; 0.279]  [1.172; 1.235]  [1.029; 1.074] 
Active buyers, in millions 3.431 0.942 1.036
 [3.312; 3.530]  [0.929; 0.957]  [1.008; 1.042] 
Active sellers, in millions 0.290 1.304 1.036
 [0.271; 0.295]  [1.286; 1.324]  [1.008; 1.042] 
Fraction of matched buyers (percent) 54.040 0.973 0.996
 [52.420; 55.100]  [0.950; 1.032]  [0.955; 1.008] 
Average number of purchases 12.726 1.028 0.991
 per month  [12.228; 13.389]  [1.000; 1.066]  [0.971; 1.015] 
Average pure grams consumed 9.464 1.004 0.988
 per month  [9.057; 9.990]  [0.977; 1.044]  [0.969; 1.016] 
Notes: This table reports market outcomes in the counterfactual cases in which buyers’ cost  K B 
and sellers’ cost  K S are  15 percent lower than in the baseline case, respectively, expressed as 
ratios over the corresponding values in the baseline case. Ninety-five percent confidence inter-
vals in brackets.
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 participation, as well as on their purchase and consumption patterns. Hence, these 
results highlight that increasing penalties may work to strengthen the  long-term 
relationships between buyers and sellers that help overcome illegal markets’ infor-
mational problems. Thus, our analysis suggests that increasing penalties may have 
contributed to the observed increased purity of retail drugs in the United States 
during the period  1990–2005; it is also consistent with the fact that the number 
of regular cocaine users does not seem to have changed considerably during the 
same period, according to data from the NSDUH and its predecessor, the National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse (Choy et al. 1998; Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration 2006). Similarly, the UN office for Drugs and Crime 
reports that  price-adjusted purity of drugs is lower in Europe than in the United 
States,28 whereas penalties for market participants—buyers, in particular—are lower 
in Europe than in the United States. Of course, there are potentially many other dif-
ferences among US markets over time, and between the US and the European mar-
kets. Nonetheless, we find it interesting that our model conforms to these aggregate 
outcomes.
V. Conclusions
This paper develops a framework to understand illicit drug markets. We focus 
on two key characteristics of illegal markets: (i) the inability to verify/contract the 
quality of the good; and (ii) penalties on market participants. Buyers’ inability to 
verify the quality of the good creates a  trade-off for sellers. On the one hand, they 
can offer  low-quality drugs, thus maximizing  short-term profits. On the other hand, 
they can offer  high-quality drugs, thus inducing buyers to purchase from them again. 
In equilibrium, a distribution of quality levels persists.
We estimate the model using data on the US market for crack cocaine. The 
model fits the data well. Our counterfactual analysis implies that buyers’ inability 
to verify the quality of the good and, thus, sellers’ moral hazard reduce the aver-
age and increase the dispersion of drug purity, thereby reducing drug consumption. 
Moreover, the estimated model implies that increasing penalties may increase the 
purity and the affordability of the drugs traded because it increases sellers’ relative 
profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus  first-time buyers.
We should point out that these results obtain in a model with important limita-
tions and, thus, we believe that it can be enhanced in several ways. As we recount 
in Section II, our  cross-sectional data impose some limitations on what our model 
can identify in the data, and richer  panel data on buyers and sellers would allow us 
to enrich our current framework. Specifically, multidimensional heterogeneity is 
difficult to identify with our data. Thus, our model focuses on a single dimension 
of heterogeneity across buyers (i.e., their taste for drugs) and across sellers (i.e., 
their cost of acquiring pure drugs), and restricts other parameters to be homoge-
neous across individuals (i.e., flow costs, the meeting rates, and the destruction 
rate) and across states (i.e., the  new-meeting rate for matched and unmatched buy-
ers). Similarly, we abstract from  time-varying frequency of consumption, which 
28 See https://data.unodc.org. 
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would be relevant, for instance, if buyers become increasingly addicted over time 
and, thus, desire to consume more. Additionally, we abstract from referrals and 
 word-of-mouth among buyers. Many structural search models share these features 
due to similar data constraints, and one objective of this paper is to adapt and to 
enrich these models to understand the key characteristics—i.e., imperfect observ-
ability and penalties—of product markets for illicit substances. Furthermore, we 
let sellers commit to a single level of quality: a model that allows sellers to dis-
criminate across their buyers or to vary quality over time would be difficult to 
identify with the available data, since we do not observe how sellers discriminate 
between  first-time buyers and repeat buyers or whether they vary their strategy over 
time.29 Nonetheless, our theoretical framework delivers rich heterogeneity across 
sellers, and our empirical model successfully matches the large heterogeneity 
observed in the data.
For these main reasons, we view this paper as a first step in quantifying the role 
of imperfect observability in search markets. The empirical application clarifies the 
data requirements to estimate such a model and how the parameters are identified, 
and the estimation delivers a sense of the magnitudes involved, allowing us to assess 
which forces dominate. Nonetheless, we hope that the future availability of richer 
data will allow us to incorporate additional features of markets for illicit substances 
or, more generally, markets in which quality uncertainty is important.
Appendix A: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
We determine the reservation quality of an unmatched buyer by equating the 
value of remaining unmatched with the value of becoming matched at  R z :
  
_
 V z =  V z ( R z ) ,
which implies equation (4). Integrating by parts, the value of being unmatched 
satisfies
  r  _ Vz =  α B (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) +  ∫  R z   _ q  V z ′ (x)(1 − F(x)) dx − p) .
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to  q , we obtain
  V z ′ (q) =  γz  _______________   r + δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q)) .
Combining the previous two equations yields equation (3).
29 Sellers may face stronger incentives to offer time-varying quality levels in the case of addiction. 
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The value of participating in the market is negative for buyers who receive no 
utility from consuming and is strictly increasing in a buyer’s marginal utility of 
consumption:
  r  _ V 0 = − α B (θ)p < 0,
  ∂ r  
_ V z  ____∂ z =  α B (θ)
×  ( ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) +  ∫  R z   _ q  γ (1 − F(x))  __________________  r + δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dx +  p __  z 2   α B (θ) γ (1  − F( R  z )) ______________________   r + δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F( R z ))) > 0.
Since the value of participating is increasing in  z , a buyer participates in the market 
only if his type is high enough. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
Fix a type- z buyer and consider his value of participating in the market as a func-
tion of the  buyer-seller ratio,  θ . If  θ is large, type- z buyer never meets with a seller 
( lim θ→∞   α B (θ) = 0 ) and, thus, his value of participating is strictly below the entry 
cost:
  lim θ→∞ 
  r  _ V z = 0 <  K B .
The value of participating in the market is strictly decreasing in  θ :
  
∂ r  _ V z  ____∂ θ =  α B ′ (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_ q  x dF(x) − p) +  z  α B ′ (θ)(r + δ)  __________ α B  (θ) 2   ∫ p/z 
 _ q 
  
γ (1 − F(x))  ________________ 
 ( r + δ _____ α B (θ) + 1 − F(x)) 
2
 
dx < 0. 
If  θ is small, a buyer meets with a seller arbitrarily often  ( lim θ→0   α B (θ) = ∞) 
and, thus, the value of participating satisfies
  lim θ→0
  r  _ V z =  lim θ→0
   α B (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) − p) ,
and the buyer participates if
  lim θ→0
   α B (θ) (z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) − p) >  K B . 
Hence, regardless of  θ , a type- z buyer never participates if  z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) ≤ p . As 
a result, there is no buyer entry  (B = 0) when  _ z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) ≤ p , which proves 
part (i) of the proposition.
When  
_
 z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) > p , a type- z buyer participates if  z  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) > p and 
if  θ is low enough. Conversely, given  θ , there is a  z(θ) , with  z(θ)  ∫ 0  
_
 q  x dF(x) > p , 
such that
  r  _ V z(θ) =  K B ,
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so that a buyer participates if and only if  z ≥ z(θ) and the measure of buyers equals 
B =  _ B (1 −  _ M (z(θ))) . Given  S , this leads to
  θ(z(θ)) =   
_
 B (1 −  _ M (z(θ)))  ____________
S
 .
We now show that, given  S and  F( · ) , there is a unique  z ∗ such that  z ∗ = z(θ( z ∗ )) . 
We show that as  z ∗ increases, the participation value of the marginal buyer type 
increases after taking into account the effect on  θ :
  
dr  _ V  z ∗   _____
d  z ∗  =  
∂ r  _ V  z ∗   _____∂  z ∗  +  
∂ r  _ V  z ∗   _____∂ θ  (− 
_
 B  _ M ′ ( z ∗ )) > 0. 
Therefore, there is a unique  z ∗ such that the unmatched value of the marginal buyer 
is exactly equal to  K B and is defined by equation (5).
This completes the proof of parts (ii) and (iii). ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
For  q ∈ [0,  R _) , we have  t(q) =  t N , which implies that  π c (0) >  π c (q) for 
q ∈ (0,  R _) . Therefore, either  q = 0 , or  q ≥  q _ for some  q _ ≥  R _ and  F is constant 
(and, hence, continuous) on  [0,  q _] . If  q _ >  _ R , then  t(q) = t( _ R ) for  q ∈ [ _ R ,  q _] , 
which implies that  π c ( _ R )  >   π c (q) for  q  ∈  ( _ R ,  q _] . Therefore,  q _    ≤   _ R . Standard argu-
ments (as in Burdett and Mortensen 1998) prove that  F is continuous and its support 
is connected on  [ q _,  _ q ] . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
We determine the number of unmatched buyers and their type distribution using 
the fact that, in steady state, the flow of buyers into and out of the matched state 
must be equal. Let  n(R) denote the number of buyers who are unmatched and 
whose type is less than  R . The total number of unmatched buyers is  n( _ R ) ≡  _ n . An 
unmatched buyer of type  R becomes matched after transacting with a seller who 
offers  above-reservation quality, which occurs at rate  α B (θ)(1 − F(R)) . A matched 
buyer exits the matched state when his match is exogenously destroyed, which 
occurs at rate  δ . In steady state:
  n′ (R) α B (θ)(1 − (F(R))) 
   = δ(BH′ (R) − n′ (R))
 ⇒ n′ (R) =  δBH′ (R)  _______________ δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(R)) .
Hence, the mass  n(R) satisfies
  n(R) =  ∫  R _ R  Bδ  _______________ δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dH(x) , 
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and, thus, the mass of matched buyers is
   B −  _ n = B  (1 −  ∫  R _  
_
 R   δ _______________ δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dH(x)) 
 =  ∫  R _  _ R   B  α B (θ)(1 − F(x))  _______________δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dH(x) .
Let  G( · ) denote the received quality distribution for matched buyers. The mass 
of matched buyers receiving quality up to  q equals  (B −  _ n ) G(q) . An unmatched 
type- R buyer flows into this group if  R ≤ q and he samples a seller who offers 
quality less than  q , which occurs at rate  α B (θ)(F(q) − F(R)) . A buyer flows out of 
this group if the match is exogenously destroyed or if he samples a new seller whose 
quality if greater than  q , which occurs at rate  δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q)) . Equating these 
flows yields
  α B (θ)  ∫  R _ q (F(q) − F(x)) dn(x) = (B −  _ n )G(q)(δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q)))
 ⇒ (B −  _ n )G(q) =  
 α B (θ) Bδ  ∫  R _ q  F(q) − F(x)  _______________ δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(x)) dH(x)   _____________________________δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q)) .
Thus,  G′ (q) satisfies (we assume, and later verify, that  F is differentiable)
  (B −  _ n )G′ (q) =   α B (θ) BδF ′ (q)H(q)  _________________    (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q))) 2 .
The number of buyers who are matched with a seller offering  q is  (B −  _ n )G′ (q) , 
and the number of sellers offering quality  q is  SF ′ (q) . Hence, the  buyer-seller ratio 
at quality  q is
  l(q) =  (B −  
_
 n )G′ (q)  __________
SF ′ (q) , 
which implies that the flow of transactions from regular buyers is
(A1)  t R (q) =  γ  α B (θ)θδH(q)  ________________    (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(q))) 2 .
Combining results completes the proof of Proposition 3. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
First, we show that  F(0) = 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. By contradiction, sup-
pose that all participating sellers offer  q = 0 . In equilibrium, their profits are equal 
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to the entry cost  K S and they are given by  π c (0) =  α B (θ)θp . Consider a seller with 
cost  c′ who deviates and offers  q′ =  _ R . His profits are
  π  c  ′   ( _ R ) =  α B (θ)θ  (1 +  γδ ___ δ 2 ) ( p − c′ 
_
 R ) ,
which is strictly greater than  K S for  c′ close enough to 0. Since  c ∈ [0,  _ c ] , such a 
type exists and strictly prefers to participate in the market, providing the desired 
 profit-increasing deviation.
Second, quality and profits are decreasing in  seller-type. Fix sellers 1 and 
2 with  c 1 >  c 2 who offer  q 1 and  q 2 . Suppose that  R _ ≤  q 2 ≤  q 1 . By revealed 
preference,
 ( p −  c 1  q 1 )t( q 1 ) ≥ ( p −  c 1  q 2 )t( q 2 ) ⇒ p(t( q 1 ) − t( q 2 )) ≥  c 1 (t( q 1 ) q 1 − t( q 2 ) q 2 ),
( p −  c 2  q 2 )t( q 2 ) ≥ ( p −  c 2  q 1 )t( q 1 ) ⇒ p(t( q 1 ) − t( q 2 )) ≤  c 2 (t( q 1 ) q 1 − t( q 2 ) q 2 ), 
which, combined with the assumption  c 1 >  c 2 , yields a contradiction. 
We have shown that  q 2 ≥  R _ ⇒  q 2 >  q 1 . Seller 2’s profits are higher 
because  π  c 2  ( q 2 ) ≥  π  c 2  ( q 1 ) >  π  c 1  ( q 1 ) . Going through similar steps proves 
that  q 2 = 0 ⇒  q 1 = 0 . Finally, if  q = 0 is offered, then there is a marginal 
seller  c ∗ > 0 such that sellers with  c >  c ∗ offer  q = 0 , and sellers with  c ≤  c ∗ 
offer  q > 0 .
The  free-entry condition implies that the profits of the marginal seller type are 
equal to  K S ; all sellers with  c <  c ∗ participate in the market; and the measure of 
sellers who offer positive quality is  S + ( c ∗ ) =  _ S  _ D ( c ∗ ) . Denote the measure of sell-
ers who participate in the market and offer  q = 0 by  S 0 , where  S 0 ≥ 0 . Their prof-
its do not depend on their type and satisfy
(A2)  p  α S  ( B _________  S + ( c ∗ ) +  S 0 ) ≤  K S ,
which holds with equality if  S 0 > 0 .
We characterize  c ∗ and  S 0 in three steps. (i) We characterize the optimal quality 
offered by the marginal seller conditional on his type and  S 0 . (ii) Given  S 0 , we show 
that there is a unique marginal type  c ∗ whose profits equal  K S . (iii) We character-
ize  S 0 .
The profits of the seller who offers the lowest positive quality (the marginal 
seller) satisfy
(A3)  π _c (q) =  α S (θ)( p − cq) (1 +  γ δH(q)  ________________  (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))) 2 ) ,
where  F(0) =   S 0  __S and  S =  S + (c) +  S 0 .
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Denote the optimal choice for a type- c seller who offers the lowest positive qual-
ity by  q _(c) . The optimal lowest positive quality is given by the root of
(A4)   π _c ′ (q) =  α S (θ)  [− c (1 +  γ δH(q)  ________________  (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))) 2 ) 
 + ( p − cq)  γ δH′ (q)  _________________  (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))) 2 ] ,
where the the  log-concavity of  H( · ) guarantees that the solution is unique:
  π _c ′′ (q) =  α S (θ)  −2c γ δH′ (q) + ( p − cq)γ δH″(q) _______________________   (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))) 2  < 0. 
Notice that it is never optimal to offer  q ∈ (0,  R _) or  q >  _ R .
We show that, given  S 0 , there is a unique marginal type  c ∗ such that his profits are 
exactly equal to  K S when he offers  q _( c ∗ ) . Notice that
  lim 
c→0
   π _c ( q _(c)) =  lim c→0 
   α S  ( B __  S 0 ) pt( q _(c)) >  K S ,
  lim 
c→ _ c 
   π _c ( q _(c)) =  α S  ( B __  S )  lim c→∞  
  ( p − c q _(c))t( q _(c)) <  K S ,
  d  π _c ( q _(c)) ________
dc
 =  π _c ′ ( q _(c))  d q _(c) ____dc +  
∂  π _c ( q _(c)) ________∂ c +  
∂  π _c  ___∂ θ  dθ ___d c ∗  < 0, 
where we assume that  
_
 c is large enough. In the last equation, the first term is 0 by 
the envelope condition; the second term is negative because higher costs reduce 
margins; and the third term is negative because an increase in  c ∗ increases the mea-
sure of participating sellers, which reduces  α S . This proves that there is a unique  c ∗ , 
given  S 0 , such that  π _( q _( c ∗ )) =  K S .
To determine  S 0 , we show that an increase in  
_
 S leads to an increase in  S + ( c ∗ ) =  _ S  _ D ( c ∗ ) and to a decrease in  θ . By contradiction, suppose the opposite. Hence,  c ∗ 
drops and, thus, the (new) marginal type’s profits are strictly greater than  K S , as he 
has lower costs and faces fewer competing sellers, yielding a contradiction.
Define  S ˆ as the measure of potential sellers such that equation (A2) holds with 
equality when  
_
 S =  S ˆ and  S 0 = 0 . If  
_
 S ≥  S ˆ, then  S 0 = 0 ,  S =  S + ( c ∗ ) , and  c ∗ 
is determined by equating (A4) to 0 and (A3) to  K S . If  
_
 S <  S ˆ, then the measure 
of sellers  S is determined by  α S ( B _S) p =  K S ;  c ∗ is determined by equating (A4) 
to 0 and (A3) to  K S ; and  S 0 = S −  S + ( c ∗ ) .
We now determine  q ∗ (c) for  c <  c ∗ . We assume that an optimal schedule  q ∗ (c) 
exists, and we rewrite the profits of a type- c seller as if he decides which other type 
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c ′ to imitate rather than which quality to offer—i.e., to imitate type  c ′ , who offers 
quality  q ′ =  q ∗ ( c ′ ) . Hence,
  π c (c′ ) =  α B (θ)θ( p − c q ∗ (c′ )) (1 +  γ δH( q 
∗ (c′ )) ____________________   (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D (c′ )) 2 ) ,
where  D(c) =   
_
 D (c) ____  D ( c ∗ ) is the distribution of sellers who offer positive quality.
Differentiating profits with respect to  c′ , we obtain
  π c ′ (c′ )  =  α B (θ)θc (− q ∗ ′(c′ ) (1 +  γ δH( q 
∗ (c′ ))  __________________  (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D(c′ )) 2 ) 
+  ( p _c  −   q ∗ (c′ )) γδ  H′ ( q ∗ (c′ )) q ∗ ′(c′ )(δ  +   α B (θ)(1  −  F(0))D(c′ ))  −  H( q ∗ (c′ ))2 α B (θ)(1  −  F(0))D′ (c′ )        __________________________________________________ (δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D(c′ ) ) 3  ) . 
By construction,  c ′ = c maximizes profits. Setting the derivative to zero, we obtain
(A5)  q ∗ ′(c) 
= − 2γ δ ( 
p
 __c −  q ∗ (c)) H( q ∗ (c)) α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D′ (c)       ______________________________________________________________________       
(δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D(c)) [(δ +  α B (θ)(1 − F(0))D(c) ) 2 + γ δH( q ∗ (c)) − γ δ ( p __c −  q ∗ (c)) H′ ( q ∗ (c))] 
. 
This differential equation and the initial condition  q ∗ ( c ∗ ) =  q _( c ∗ ) determine  q ∗ (c) 
for  c <  c ∗ . ∎
Appendix B: Selection into ADAM
In this Appendix, we derive the density of log preferences  z in the ADAM dataset.
We denote the events of arrest by  A , of no arrest by  A C , of using drugs (i.e., par-
ticipation in the market) by  U , and of not using drugs by  U C . The fractions of agents 
who use drugs and do not use drugs are, respectively,
  P(U ) = (1 − λ)(1 − M( z ∗ )),
 P ( U C ) = λ +  (1 − λ) M( z ∗ ), 
where we recall that  M( · ) is the distribution of preferences  z , which we assume to be 
log-normal with parameters  μ z and  σ z , and  z ∗ is the preference of the marginal buyer.
An individual who does not use drugs is arrested if  η ≥ 0 , where  η is normally 
distributed with mean  μ η and variance  σ η 2. Therefore, the arrest rate of  nonusers is
  P  (A |  U C ) = 1 − Φ ( − μ η  ____ σ η  ) = Φ (  μ η  ___ σ η ) , 
where  Φ( · ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution.
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A drug user with taste  z is arrested if  log (z) + η ≥ 0 . Therefore, the arrest rate 
of drug users is
   P(A | U ) = Pr (log (z) + η ≥ 0 | z ≥  z ∗ )
 =  1 ________________ 
1 − Φ  ( log ( z ∗ ) −  μ z   _________ σ z  ) 
 ∫ log( z ∗ ) ∞  1 __  σ z ϕ  ( log (z) −  μ z   _________ σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η   _________ σ η  ) d log (z) .
Thus, the aggregate arrest rate is
(B1)  P (A) =  (λ +  (1 − λ) Φ ( log ( z ∗ ) −  μ z   _________ σ z  ) ) Φ (  μ η  ___ σ η ) 
 +  (1 − λ)  ∫ log( z ∗ ) ∞  1 __  σ z ϕ ( log (z) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η   _________ σ η  ) d log (z) . 
The fraction of drug users among those arrested (i.e., in ADAM) equals
 P(U | A) =  P(A | U)P(U)  __________
P(A) 
 =   ∫ log( z ∗ ) 
∞
  1 __  σ z ϕ  ( log (z) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η ________  σ η  ) d log (z)       __________________________________________________________       
 ( λ ____ 1 − λ + Φ ( log ( z 
∗ ) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) ) Φ (  μ η  __ σ η ) +  ∫ log( z ∗ ) ∞  1 __  σ z ϕ ( log (z) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η ________  σ η  ) d log (z)
.
Similarly, the fraction of drug users among those not arrested (i.e., in the NSDUH) 
equals
(B2) P  (U |  A C ) =  P  ( A C | U) P(U )  __________
P  ( A C )  
 =   ∫ log( z ∗ ) 
∞  1 __  σ z ϕ  ( log (z) −  μ z   ________ σ z  ) (1 − Φ ( log (z) +  μ η   ________ σ η  ) ) d log (z)        _______________________________________________________________        
 1 ____ 
1 − λ −  ( λ ____ 1 − λ + Φ ( log ( z 
∗ ) −  μ z   ________ σ z  ) ) Φ (  μ η  __ σ η ) −  ∫ log( z ∗ ) ∞  1 __  σ z ϕ ( log (z) −  μ z   ________ σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η   ________ σ η  ) d log (z)
. 
Finally, the density of log preferences of drug users in ADAM satisfies
(B3)  ϕ ( 
log (z) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η  ________ σ η  )     _______________________________    
 ∫ 
log( z ∗ ) 
∞ ϕ ( log (z) −  μ z ________  σ z  ) Φ ( log (z) +  μ η  ________ σ η  ) d log (z)
for z ≥  z ∗ .
In practice, the density (B3) is the density of buyers’ preferences weighted by the 
probability  Φ ( log (z) +  μ η  _______ σ η  ) of being in ADAM.
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